JPRS 78108

19 May 1981

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1591

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U.S., NATO MILITARISTIC POLICIES UNDERMINE DETENTE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 4 Feb 81) pp 47-59

[Article by A. Nikonov and R. Faramazyan: "Dangerous Policy of Heating Up Military Tension"]

[Text] Detente has been transformed into the leading trend in the development of international relations in the 1970's, on the basis of fundamental changes in the balance of forces in the world arena in favor of peace and socialism and thanks to the purposeful activity of the Soviet Union first of all, the socialist community and other progresive forces, and also realistic representatives of the ruling circles of the capitalist countries. After more than two decades of "cold war" unleashed by imperialist reaction, real prospects for finally removing the heavy burden of the arms race, reducing the threat of thermonuclear war, and applying all their resources and energy to creative labor in the name of peace and the social progress of humanity have opened up to the peoples of the globe.

The process of detente has been marked by positive shifts in the strengthening of international security, in developing mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social structures. Important landmarks along this path have been changes for the better in Soviet-American relations, normalization of the political situation in Europe, the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was crowned with the unanimous adoption by 35 states of a Final Document, a kind of charter of international life based on recognition of the necessity for peaceful coexistence.

During those same 1970's, promising bilateral and multilateral steps were taken to limit the arms race and lower the level of military confrontation. In the area of Soviet-American relations, special note should be taken of the signing in May 1972 of the "Agreement to Limit Anti-Missile Defense Systems" and the "Temporary Agreement on Certain Measures in the Area of Limiting Strategic Offensive Weapons," the Soviet-American "Agreement on Preventing Nuclear War" (June 1973) and the achievement of other Soviet-American agreements of a military-political nature which have been aimed at reducing military danger.

We could also point to such fundamentally important multilateral agreements as the "Agreement on Prohibiting the Deployment of Nuclear Arms and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and Beneath Them" (February 1971), the "Convention Prohibiting the Development, Production and Stocking of Bacteriological

(Biological) and Toxic Weapons and Their Destruction" (April 1972) and the "Convention Prohibiting Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Means of Influencing the Environment" (May 1977). These documents, together with the "Agreement to Stop the Spread of Nuclear Weapons" signed in 1968 and the "Agreement on the Principles of State Research on and Use of Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (January 1967) have formed a whole system of international agreements which have cleared the way to curtailing the arms race, to real disarmament.

Successful development of detente and its initial tangible fruit could not but have gladdened many millions of people of our planet who are vitally interested in international security and strengthening peace.

However, all this in no way gladdened reactionary imperialist forces who strove in every way possible during those years to oppose the development of realistic trends in U.S. and other NATO-country foreign policies, who did not cease to undermine political, and especially military, detente. As the 1970's became the 1980's, these forces shifted to a direct counter-offensive against detente, peace and the rights of peoples, which has led to a serious deterioration in the whole international situation.

This turn of events was not unexpected. The USSR and other countries of the socialist community have repeatedly warned -- and subsequently been proven right -- that there would be high and low tides in the policy of detente, that peace could be reliably ensured only in a stubborn struggle between a policy of disarmament, strengthening peace and ridding humanity of the threat of thermonuclear war, on the one hand, and a policy of urging on the arms race, "balancing on the edge" of such a war for the sake of preserving and strengthening the weakening positions of imperialism in the world, on the other.

Their forming a political bloc with Peking hegemonists has played a considerable role in intensifying aggressive tendencies in the foreign policies of the ruling circles of the USA and other NATO countries. The Chinese leaders' break with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and their chauvinist foreign policy course permeated with anti-Sovietism, their persistent sabotaging of international agreements on limiting the arms race, their open support of the most reactionary regimes, including the fascist Pinochet regime in Chili, their military and other assistance to all sorts of schisms in the national liberation movement and, finally, their direct military aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam -- all this has been for the imperialist forces an additional incentive to switch to a counter-attack on detente.

By supercharging international tension, by hindering detente and whipping up the arms race, imperialist reaction would like to substantially retard the economic development and improvement in the well-being of the peoples of the Sovier Union and other countries of the socialist community and, in so doing, weaken the attraction of socialism and the degree of its influence on international relations. Of course, such calculations and hopes of the enemies of socialism have more than once now been turned into the grossest errors and most bitter disappointments. However, as we see, they have still not changed their shortsighted policies and are unwilling to draw realistic conclusions from historical experience.

Certain imperialist circles are frightened by the prospect of concluding new and more effective disarmament agreements and other military detente measures with the

Soviet Union. It is inconvenient for them that, given detente in the military area, the myth of a so-called "Soviet military threat," fear of which has for many decades been an integral element in both the foreign and domestic policies of imperialism, would unavoidably be increasingly dispelled. The demand that this myth be used has become especially sharp given the general economic and political instability of capitalism, the growing struggle of workers in the capitalist countries for their rights and interests.

The fact that adding military detente to political detente might restrict even more their opportunities for armed resistance to progressive social changes in the world, which are occurring in particular in the course of the historically natural national liberation anti-imperialist struggle of peoples for their own freedom and independence, is also inconvenient for the aggressive circles of imperialism.

Militaristic and military-industrial circles have played and continue to play an enormous role in current imperialist policy. This applies especially to the ruling spheres of the USA. Their hostile approach to detente as a whole and to military detente in particular results foremost from an organic unwillingness to accept the very fact that strategic equilibrium has evolved between the USSR and the USA, from a striving to change it in favor of Washington by any means. Hence, their negative attitude towards the principle of equality and the identical security of the parties as a fundamental principle of all practical steps involving detente in the military area, including Soviet-American talks and agreements on limiting strategic arms. It is therefore by no means accidental that one of the central objectives of the attacks made during the course of the noisy propaganda campaign which has unfolded in the USA has been precisely the Soviet-American SALT-2 Agreement based on that principle.

The calculations by some U.S. ruling circles that, in an atmosphere of international tension, it would be easier for them to preserve their leading position in the capitalist world than under detente have also been of not inconsiderable importance. They are afraid that deepening detente will weaken the bonds of "Atlantic solidarity." The persistent striving by Washington to bind its NATO allies more tightly to itself using long-term programs of increasing military preparations is very indicative of that.

Of course, a considerable share of the responsibility for retarding detente and heating up international tension also lies with the ruling circles of other NATO countries, which have largely been solid backers of their transoceanic partners. However, the level of that solidarity and its practical influence on the foreign policies of each of these countries are unique. They depend on the internal political situation, geostrategic position, and also on a complex interweaving of many other factors determining both the nature of the interest of a particular country in continuing detente and the level of its participation in the anti-detente campaign.

The shift of the ruling circles of the USA and a number of other imperialist countries to the counter-attack against detente signifies a serious change in their foreign policies towards intensifying aggressiveness and adventurism. By placing their main reliance on military might as the primary means of achieving their goals, such policies have come to acquire an increasingly militaristic character. In this regard, nonmilitary factors of force -- economic, ideological and others -- are being evaluated by the governing bodies of the USA and NATO foremost from the viewpoint of

the possibility of their maximum use to weaken the economic and morale-political components of the defense potential of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.

Quite naturally, militarization of the foreign-policy course of ruling circles of the USA and other NATO countries could not but be adequately reflected in their military-political thinking, their military strategy, thus confirming the truth of one of the fundamental theses of military science, that the interrelationships between military strategy and politics are in the end built on the principle of the former being completely dependent on the latter. A logical consequence of the intensified aggressiveness and adventurism of U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970's was President Carter's proclamation of equally aggressive and adventuristic military-strategic concepts and aims.

Proceeding from the precise delimitation, accepted in Soviet military science, of such concepts as military doctrine, military strategy and military-strategic concepts, we can state that Carter's military-strategic "innovations" do not go beyond the framework of U.S. state military doctrine which has evolved and been in effect, with certain modifications, throughout the post-war period. Without altering the essence of that military doctrine, they make certain adjustments in U.S. military strategy to attach an even more aggressive character to it and bring it into conformity with the tasks of a counter-offensive against detente, with a policy of changing the military balance at global and regional levels in favor of imperialism. All these new concepts are unified by a single common idea, making nuclear war an "acceptable" means of achieving the foreign-policy goals of American imperialism, expanding the spectrum of international-political situations in which ordinary and nuclear military force could be used with the least risk to one's self.

The concept of "limited nuclear war" embodied in the famous Directive No 59 signed by President J. Carter in July 1980 is especially dangerous. At least two other directives are directly affiliated with it: No 58, on steps to protect the civilian and military leadership of the USA in case of nuclear war, and No 53, which concerns preserving and providing means of control in such a war.

It is quite obvious that, from the moment they came to light, the new White House directives have signified a conscious orientation towards whipping up the arms race, foisting it off on other countries, and retarding if not disrupting the entire detente process. The political content of Directive No 59 and those accompanying it testify to a cynical contempt for the most important Soviet-American documents of the early 1970's, to which three U.S. presidents affixed their signatures. Let us recall that the Soviet-American communique on the results of the highest-level Geneva meeting of 15-18 June 1979 states: "Each party states that it is not striving and will not strive for military superiority, inasmuch as that can only lead to dangerous instability, by generating a higher level of armament, which will not ensure the security of either of the parties."1

It might be added that the claim of military superiority over the Soviet Union which is the basis of the military-strategic concepts left President R. Reagan by the J. Carter administration is absolutely incompatible with the principle of equality and

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1. "Radi mira na zemle. Sovetsko-amerikanskaya vstrecha na vysshem urovne v Vene 15-18 iyunya 1979 goda. Dokumenty, rechi, materialy" [For Peace on Earth. Highest-Level Soviet-American Geneva Meeting of 15-18 June 1979. Documents, Speeches, Materials], Moscow, 1979, p 61.

identical security of the parties, on which all Soviet-American talks and agreements in the military-political area, including SALT-1 and SALT-2, have been based.

The Carter "limited nuclear war" plan arose by no means out of thin air. The root of Directive No 59, the idea that it is possible to wage a "limited," "controlled" nuclear war, is not something fundamentally new to the military-strategic thinking of the ruling circles of the USA. This idea was also present in the "flexible response" strategy and in a modified version of that strategy, "realistic deterrent," and in the concepts advanced in the 1960's and 1970's by then secretaries of defense R. MacNamara and J. Schlessinger.

At the same time, this version contains new elements which make it especially dangerous and reckless. Anticipating a nuclear first strike by the USA, not only at military and industrial targets, but also at the military-political control centers of a probable enemy, Directive No 59 has in mind not simply an arithmetic increase in the number of possible targets, but the acquisition by the United States of the capability of paralyzing responses by the other party, forcing it to capitulate. In other words, the Carter "model," unlike any of its predecessors, counts on the possibility of achieving a decisive victory using "limited" nuclear war. In this regard, reliance is placed not only on improving the methods of waging such a war by the United Stated, but also the creation of corresponding new military technical means. Directive No 59 seems to "program" a forced whipping up of the nuclear missile arms race, foremost along the lines of continued qualitative improvement in such arms.

In describing the true meaning of Directive No 59, L. I. Brezhnev noted. "Its primary essence in fact reduces to making the idea of nuclear was somehow acceptable to public opinion. That is the purpose of discussing what is called 'limited,' 'partial' use of nuclear weapons, which has nothing to do with reality and only deceives the people. A policy extremely dangerous to all the peoples of the world! It is hard even to imagine that it comes from the government of a country which signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on preventing nuclear war."[1]

Apologists for "limited nuclear war" consciously avoid the fundamental question: are there and can there be any reliable guarantees whatsoever that a "limited" nuclear war will not grow into a worldwide thermonuclear catastrophe? There are no such guarantees, nor can there be. That alone is enough to view Directive No 59 as playing with fire, as an example of irresponsible disdain for the fate of humanity, including the fate of the American people. It follows even from the approximate estimates by American experts that not less than 140 million Americans would die and 75 percent of the country's economic potential would be destroyed in a nuclear war if it came to the USA.

Official approval of the "limited nuclear war" concept at a NATO nuclear planning group meeting in late 1980 and its acceptance as a principle of strategic planning for the entire North Atlantic bloc testifies to the fact that the governments of the states comprising it are assuming the role of accomplices of U.S. aggressive circles, and in so doing, an enormous responsibility to the peoples of their own countries.

Acceptance of the "limited nuclear war" concept and admitting the possibility of waging such a war in Western Europe regardless of whether the governments of Western European NATO member-nations want one or not can have the most tragic consequences

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1. PRAVDA, 20 August 1980.

for those countries. We cannot ignore the fact that one of the basic goals of the Carter concept is to wage a "limited" nuclear war on the land of other states, including NATO allies, and, in so doing, to avoid a retaliation strike at the USA itself. It is quite obvious that, in this instance, a "limited" nuclear war would be total in nature for the Western European states and could lead to their total physical destruction.

The decision made at the Brussels NATO council session in December 1979 to deploy American medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe corresponds in significant measure to the ideas and aims of Carter's Directive No 59.

At the military-technical level, the appearance of the very idea of deploying qualitatively new medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe was closely connected with the program for creating new weapons systems of that type -- cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles, as well as with the decision made back in 1975 to "modernize" NATO nuclear potential.

That fact deserves special attention, for all the subsequent noisy propaganda campaign undertaken to justify the deployment of American medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe was and continues to be built on the thoroughly false thesis that such deployment is a response to Soviet missiles called SS-20's in NATO terminology. In this connection, it is to the point to recall that almost immediately after the 1974 Vladivostok SALT-2 talks, the American side began, under various far-fetched pretexts, to avoid including cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km in "ceilings" just agreed to with the Soviet side, which was one of the serious causes of the SALT-2 talks being stretched out for nearly five years.

This circumstance clearly demonstrated that the American side associated the creation and deployment of medium-range cruise missiles and their exclusion from the "ceilings" agreed to in Vladivostok with their own hopes of evading the fundamental principle of equality and identical security in order to obtain a military-strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. In the course of subsequent talks, the USA, as is known, agreed to include in the levels agreed to only air-based cruise missiles (deployed in strategic bombers). But concerning surface and sea-based cruise missiles, Washington wanted to simply defer deploying them until after 31 December 1981, that is, only for the period the SALT-2 Agreement Protocol would be in effect. The true reason for this position was revealed in the Brussels NATO decision. The real state of affairs was the same -- an effort to subvert the detente process, to upset the strategic equilibrium in favor of the USA and NATO, and to achieve for them military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The Brussels decision's purpose was a very substantial disruption of the entire Soviet-American strategic balance. If deployed in Western Europe, the 572 American medium-range nuclear weapons -- 464 Tomahawk cruise missiles and 108 Pershing-2 ballistic missiles --would be able to reach the Soviet Union, while medium-range Soviet missiles, including the SS-20, would be unable to reach the USA. Thus, from the viewpoint of the security of the Soviet Union, the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe would make them not operational-tactical weapons, but strategic weapons, which would violate the quantitative "ceilings" set for the strategic weapons of both parties by the SALT-2 Agreement in favor of the USA. For the Soviet Union the levels would have remained as before -- 2,400 and 2,250, while for the USA, they would actually have increased to 2,972 and 2,822, respectively.

But that is only the quantitative side of the matter. Its qualitative side is no less important. By being located near the borders of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, American "Eurostrategic" missiles would be first-strike weapons. In this regard, it is especially important to note that the flight time of Pershing-2 missiles to targets on Soviet territory would be only about four minutes. And that itself would give the USA very substantial strategic advantages, changing the strategic situation on both regional-European and global levels appreciably in its favor.

In other words, the Brussels decision was oriented towards obtaining quantitative and qualitative superiority over the USSR in the area of strategic weapons and is, for this reason, a very gross violation of the principle of the equality and identical security of the parties.

The so-called "Carter Doctrine" occupies an appreciable place among the military-political concepts advanced in connection with the shift by U.S. ruling circles to the counter-offensive against detente. Its main provisions were put forward in concentrated form in a speech by the U.S. president at the Council of Industrialists (in December 1979), in the "State of the Union" message to Congress in January 1980, in a 23 January 1980 address at a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, and in speeches by his closest assistants, Assistant for National Security Z. Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense G. Brown.

All the content of the "doctrine" is openly aggressive and hegemonistic in nature, permeated through and through with the intention of imposing its will on other states' and peoples, placing disposal of their natural resources at its discretion, shamelessly flouting their sovereign rights, interfering in their internal affairs, inciting armed conflicts and using military force where and when Washington's politicians and strategists think it necessary. The heart of the "Carter Doctrine" is its declared -- in violation of the UN Charter and generally recognized norms of international law -- inclusion of an overwhelming majority of the regions of the globe among the "vital interests" of the USA -- Europe and the South Atlantic, Latin America and Africa, the Far East, Southern and Southeastern Asia, the Near and Middle East.

Under the false pretext of defending their "vital interests," American ruling circles have unfolded broad-scale militarist preparations. One manifestation of this is the decision to create special "rapid deployment forces" whose specific purpose is to conduct punitive operations and other military adventures in regions many thousands of kilometers from the United States. It is very significant that this very concept was born in the USA long before the events in Iran and Afghanistan, which J. Carter used to justify the "doctrine" he advanced.

The sources of this idea can be found in the declarations made in the heat of the 1973-1974 energy crisis by then Secretary of State H. Kissinger and Secretary of Defense J. Schlessinger, who proved the "necessity" of increasing the American military presence in the Near and Middle East. Z. Brzezinski subsequently assumed the task of theoretically substantiating such a presence not only in that region, but also in other regions of the world. In December 1978, he publicly advanced the concept of U.S. "strategic responsibility" for the state of affairs in a so-called 'arc of instability," in which he arbitrarily included a number of countries of East Africa (Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia), Southwest and Southeast Asia (Oman, South Yemen, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malasia, Singapore) and Australia.

The concept of U.S. "strategic responsibility" was concretized in late 1978 in a report, "Military Alternatives in the Persian Gulf," prepared on instructions from Secretary of Defense C. Brown. It directly points out the necessity of forming highly mobile troop units intended to operate in that region and it outlined steps to create weapons and ammunition stockpiles in Saudi Arabia and other petroleum-extracting countries of the southern Persian Gulf, Egypt and Israel, stockpiles which could be used by the Pentagon if necessary.

Soon after the "Carter Doctrine" was proclaimed, the beginning of the formation of "rapid deployment forces" was officially declared. Lt Gen P. Kelly was named their commander. According to initial government preliminary plans, they were to number 100,000 personnel, but that was then increased to 200,000 or more marines, airborne troops and navy personnel.

The composition of the new military formation and its material and technical supply were planned by the Pentagon for military operations in any region of the world without reinforcements or resupply for 60 days. According to presidential memorandum No 51, Lt Gen P. Kelly was instructed to be ready to use nuclear weapons in the Near East.

At the same time, J. Carter's administration began a massive concentration of naval forces and marines and aviation units attached to them in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. After concentrating upwards of 40 warships there, including several aircraft carriers with planes carrying nuclear weapons, the USA has significantly aggravated what was already a very explosive situation in the region and has intensified the overall tension in the world.

J. Carter, Z. Brzezinski, G. Brown and a number of other officials of the last administration made considerable efforts to draw NATO allies into joint participation in militaristic actions in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In answering Washington's summons, the British conservative government officially supported the basic provisions of the "Carter Doctrine" and expressed its intention to revive the British military presence "east of the Suez." In turn, certain FRG officials, foremost the leaders of parties of the right, declared it necessary to "broaden the tasks" of the Bundeswehr and also the possibility of using West German naval forces in Persian Gulf operations. France, without approving U.S. actions in that region, still has strengthened its military presence in the Indian Ocean.

The dangerous military-strategic concepts and the practical steps taken by the USA and other NATO countries based on them at the global and regional levels have increased political and military tension in the world and are undermining international security.

In the final analysis, the new aggressive tendencies in U.S. and NATO foreign policy and military strategy are also determining the primary directions of military preparations and the quantitative levels and qualitative status of the armed forces and weapons of the North Atlantic bloc, which clearly exceed defense needs and are clearly offensive in nature.

Active material preparations for war have led to a situation in which NATO bloc expenditures have reached unprecedented amounts. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, NATO countries began a new stage in intensifying military preparations. The long-range military program through 1993 adopted in May 1978 at a NATO Council session in

Washington anticipates the implementation of a whole complex of concrete measures aimed at further increasing the aggregate military might of NATO. This is the largest program of military preparations, in scope, in the entire history of that bloc. In the words of those who drew it up, it "marks a new era for NATO by placing the defense plans of the alliance on a more long-term foundation."[1]

A series of measures has been worked out in detail along the following main lines: increasing the overall combat readiness of the armed forces, modernizing and strengthening Western European theater nuclear forces, increasing the mobility of the armed forces and the mobilization readiness of the reserve, strengthening the navy and antiaircraft defense, improving communications systems and troop material-technical supply, creating newer means of waging radio-electronic war, and making the entire system of military preparations more efficient.

With a view towards implementing the measures outlined, they plan to spend enormous sums. The NATO Council session mentioned decided on an annual increase in military expenditures of three percent in real terms (that is, taking inflation into account) by all bloc participants. Based on such an annual increment, NATO total military expenditures will be increased from $222 billion in 1979 to $265 billion in 1985 and will exceed $300 billion in 1990.

The facts bear out that the U.S. military budget will grow even faster in the years ahead. According to the five-year program for developing the American Armed Forces in 1981-1985, annual rates of real increment in military expenditures of 4-5 percent are anticipated for that period. The policies of the administration of newly elected President R. Reagan answer the question of what the actual dynamics of growth in military expenditures will be in the years ahead. W. Van Clive, his advisor on military policy, stated that the president might insist on increasing military expenditures by more than seven percent per year in real terms.[2] That would naturally lead to a substantial intensification of the arms race in the USA, with all the consequences stemming from that.

The USA is not only forcing the arms race itself, but is also strongly spurring its partners on to do the same. Particular pressure is being put on those Western European countries for which it will be very hard to carry out the decision on an annual three-percent increase in military expenditures, due to the economic difficulties they are experiencing and for other reasons.

The military programs inherited by R. Reagan from the preceding administration largely determine the size of future military budgets and the scope and tempo of U.S. and NATO military preparations. The large-scale, technically complex programs are aimed first of all at qualitative improvement in weapons, with the extensive use of scientific and technical achievements for military purposes. And that will lead to the creation of even more destructive weapons types and systems, and each new generation will, experience shows, be considerably more expensive than the preceding.

Such work has achieved its greatest scope in the USA. According to official data, in the mid-1980's, the total cost of just 46 programs to develop large weapons systems

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1. NATO REVIEW, No 4, 1978, p 30.

2. See: DEFENSE INDUSTRY REPORT, 17 November 1980, p 443.

is estimated to be more than $260 billion.[1] Ever-increasing amounts are being directed into carrying out strategic nuclear missile weapons programs. Much attention is being paid to developing the underground MX mobile missile system. The plan is to deploy 200 such missiles. Of the total amount proposed for this system, estimated to be more than $33 billion, $10 billion will be expenditures on developing and producing the missiles themselves and upwards of $23 billion will be for building a fundamentally new complex for the mobile subsurface "Racetrack," which will consist of 4,600 protected shelters.

The Pentagon continues to spend huge sums on the sea-based Trident nuclear missile system. Its overall cost is estimated to be $78.8 billion by mid-1980.[2] In late 1979, the first nuclear submarine re-equipped with Trident-1 missiles, the Lafayette, joined the fleet. In August 1981, the lead nuclear submarine with Trident-1 missiles, the Trident, is to begin operating. In 1981-1985, the plan is to arm six such submarines with these missiles, and three each in each of the following two years. The Pentagon initially planned to purchase 13 nuclear submarines with Trident-1 missiles. Moreover, Trident-1 missiles are to be deployed in place of Poseidon missiles on 12 Lafayette nuclear submarines in 1980-82.[3] At the same time, development of the Trident-2 continues, series production to begin in the late 1980's.

A program to modify the B-52 to carry cruise missiles is in the implementation stage. The plan is to deploy approximately 3,400 strategic cruise missiles on 173 B-52 carrier aircraft by 1990.[4] Taking modernization of these bombers into account, direct capital expenditures on the program are estimated at $5.3 billion.[5] Development of a new type of strategic bomber has begun, with the intention of arming it with supersonic cruise missiles.

Preparations to develop ground-based cruise and Pershing-2 missiles are proceeding apace, these missiles to be deployed in Western European NATO countries. Total expenditures on these programs will be approximately $3.9 billion.

Substantial modernization and up-dating of nuclear warheads themselves is planned for the 1980's. Production lines have been expanded for manufacturing and assembling type W-78, W-76 and W-80 nuclear warheads. New 200-kiloton W-80 nuclear warheads will be made available to strategic aviation, as will B-43, B-61 and B-77 modified nuclear bombs of several hundred kilotons.

Re-equipping the Armed Forces with new types of conventional weapons will be accelerated. In order to increase the strike power of tactical aviation, the Pentagon is taking significant steps to modernize and increase the number of aircraft, in particular by releasing new F-15 fighters (at a total program cost estimated at $14.2 billion), F-16's ($18.8 billion), F-18's ($29.7 billion) and the direct-support A-10 ($6.0 billion).[6]

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1. See: Ibid., 15 November 1980, p 361.
2. See: Ibid., p 362.
3. See: AEROSPACE DAILY, Vol 102, No 7, 11 March 1980, p 50.
4. See: Ibid., Vol 98, No 10, 16 June 1979, p 79.
5. See: DEFENSE INDUSTRY REPORT, 15 September 1980, pp 362-363.
6. Ibidem.

Much importance is being attached to re-equipping the navy in long-range plans. Thus, whereas the "sliding" five-year 1980-1984 program planned requests to Congress for $38.8 billion to build 67 naval combat and other ships, the 1981-1985 program projects a figure of $45.1 billion to build 97 combat and other ships.

The production of new armored equipment is being expanded. The Pentagon has accelerated its acceptance of the main combat tank, the XM-1. Whereas the initial plan proposed purchasing 3,325 such tanks, it was decided in 1978 to purchase upwards of 7,000 (for a total of more than $13 billion). The plan is to expand production of artillery and other conventional weapons.

Substantial steps are also being undertaken to force the arms race in Western European NATO countries. The FRG offers a clear example of the recent trend observed in bloc countries towards substantially increasing military expenditures. According to data from the International Strategic Research Institute of London, FRG military expenditures have increased from $16.1 billion in 1975 to $25.1 billion in 1980. The FRG, which is second to the USA in terms of NATO military expenditures, has recently begun implementing a broad program of modernizing and strengthening all its armed forces and plans to spend enormous sums on developing and producing the latest types of arms and military equipment. In 1976, Bonn adopted a long-term program to re-equip the Bundeswehr with new weapons systems, the program to be completed in 1986. They plan to spend more than 50 billion marks on carrying it out.[1] Production of the new Leopard-2 tank, 1,800 of which will be provided the Bundeswehr prior to 1986, is continuing. The total cost of the program is 6.5 billion marks. A new Leopard-3 tank (FRG - France) is in the development stage. These same countries are jointly developing a "tank of the 1990's," already subsidized by three billion francs.[2] The FRG government is directing significant resources into rearming its own armed forces with new combat aircraft (Tornado, Alphajet and others), ships, artillery and other new military equipment.

The Bundeswehr will become the main NATO strike force in Europe. Nearly 80 percent of the arms and military equipment it receives comes from West German military concerns. Upwards of 5,000 enterprises and companies, not counting small concerns, participate in FRG military production. The Federal Military Equipment Department concludes about 30,000 contracts each year on arms production, worth a total of 10-12 billion marks. Some 120 institutions of higher learning, more than 70 scientific research institutes and 60 industrial development scientific centers work in the Bundeswehr. Nearly half the funds being allocated from the state budget for scientific research are being directed into developing military equipment.

In Britain, military preparations increased sharply when the Conservative government headed by M. Thatcher came to power; it adopted a policy of increasing military expenditures and accelerating the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons. Great Britain's military budget has increased from 6.9 billion pounds sterling in 1978/79 to 10.8 billion in the 1980/81 fiscal year.[3]

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1. See: DIE WELT, 30 September 1977.

2. Ibid., 17 February 1980.

3. See: "Defence in the 1980's. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980," Vol II, London, 1980, p 20.

Great Britain was one of the first countries in NATO to assume an obligation to deploy American medium-range nuclear weapons on its territory. In 1980, the Thatcher government adopted a new arms "build-up" plan which anticipated equipping British nuclear submarines with American Trident-1 missiles, which will increase the strike potential of Britain's nuclear forces several-fold. It plans to build four or five new nuclear submarines, which will cost at least five billion pounds sterling. The question of creating neutron weapons is being examined. In mid-1980, it declared Britain's intention to re-equip the British Rhine Army with new Challenger tanks (500-600 of them) and new types of armored transports (up to 2,000 vehicles). Delivery of the tanks will begin in 1984. The production of other types of conventional weapons is being speeded up.

In accordance with the six-year plan for re-equipping the armed forces (1977-1982), the absolute and relative scales of increment in the military might of France are increasing steadily. Particular attention is being paid to further importing and strengthening its nuclear potential through the development of second- and third-generation ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, by accepting a new mobile missile of this class for deployment after 1990, by re-equipping the first five nuclear missile submarines with new M-20 ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads of one megaton each, and after 1985, with multiple-warhead M-4's. It proposes putting a sixth (and qualitatively new) submarine into operation in 1985, the Enflexible, to be equipped with multiple-warhead M-4 missiles with a range of upwards of 4,000 km. It also plans to modernize its nuclear Mirage IV A bombers.

The plan is to continue equipping French armed forces with tactical nuclear weapons, as well as to develop neutron weapons. According to official data published on 18 October 1980 in Le Monde, total French expenditures on nuclear arms development and vehicles for such weapons have been 222 billion francs from 1960 to 1980.

Implementation of the broad complex of military preparations programs adopted by NATO countries is having a substantial impact on the scope and structure of their military-economic preparations. The bulk of the economic potential of modern capitalism is concentrated in the NATO countries. In 1979, they accounted for upwards of 68 percent of total industrial production in the developed capitalist countries and 58 percent of industrial production in all nonsocialist countries. Bloc participants also have considerable manpower available to them. All this serves as a material basis for systematically increasing militaristic preparations.

The leading NATO states have created and are striving to maintain in a state of high mobilization readiness a large military industrial production apparatus. Its main branches, especially in the USA, have significant surplus production capacity, which can be used for rapidly developing the production of military output under emergency conditions. Bloc leaders have recently been paying more attention to strengthening and improving the production base of their military industry. This results largely from the fact that they plan to begin producing a new series of weapons systems employing the latest scientific and technical achievements in the near future.

The development of such systems is accompanied by a whole series of measures aimed at eliminating existing weaknesses and bottlenecks in military industry, at strengthening and modernizing its production apparatus. To these ends, equipment is up-dated, technology is improved and various measures are carried out to stimulate new capital investment. Much attention is being paid to introducing new technology and automating production.

A complex of measures to intensify the military economy and increase the effectiveness of military expenditures is being carried out in the NATO countries. The reliance is first of all to the extensive use of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, to improving the system of planning, financing, organizing and managing military preparations. Increasing importance is being attached to intensifying integration processes in the military-economic area, to standardizing arms, to the international cooperation and coordination of long-range, large-scale programs to increase the bloc's military might.

The arms race has reached impressive proportions in other imperialist states besides NATO member-nations. Military expenditures in Japan, for example, have increased rapidly, from 1,512.4 billion yen in the 1976/77 fiscal year to 2,230.2 billion yen ($10.137 billion) in the 1979/80 fiscal year. Reactionary circles are managing to modernize and substantially strengthen the armed forces of the country. Military preparations are being carried out within the framework of the American-Japan "security agreement." The USA is intensifying its pressure on Tokyo, demanding accelerated militarization, increased military might, a greater contribution to joint military measures, an expansion of Japanese obligations in the Pacific Ocean zone and greater participation by Tokyo in Pentagon global strategy.

Many of the developing countries are also being drawn more and more into the arms race. Their military expenditures have grown more rapidly than those in the world as a whole in recent years. Further whipping up of military preparations will lead not only to an increasing danger of thermonuclear war, but also to growth in extravagant military expenditures, which significantly retard economic development.

The shift to the counter-attack against detente and peace by aggressive forces, accompanied by a whipping up of the arms race, is a direct challenge not only to the world of socialism, against which it is primarily aimed, but also to the overwhelming majority of humanity, which is vitally interested in preventing a thermonuclear world war and in strengthening international security.

In the present, appreciably exacerbated international situation, the Soviet Union continues to follow firmly its own peace-loving policy, supported by all progressive forces on the planet. L. I. Brezhnev declared: "We oppose the 'doctrine' of military hysteria and a feverish arms race with a doctrine of systematic struggle for peace and security on Earth. We are faithful to the Peace Program put forward by the 24th and 25th Congresses of our party. We therefore stand for a strengthening of detente, not its destruction, now in the 1980's, as we did in the 1970's. We stand for a reduction in arms, not for fanning the flames of the arms race. We stand for rapprochement and mutual understanding among peoples, not for artificial estrangement and enmity."[1]

The Soviet Union and the fraternal countries of socialism are doing everything which depends on them to strengthen world peace, repulse the aggressive forces of imperialism, continue and deepen international political and military detente. The support of the overwhelming majority of humanity is on their side in this noble cause.

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1. PRAVDA 23 February 1980.

SUPPLY PROBLEMS FOR REMOTE SITE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 81 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Lt Col A. Bedzhanyan from the Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "A Forgotten 'Point'"]

[Text] The editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA received a letter from the air unit X in which it stated that the everyday life of the signal troops serving at the "point" was poorly organized. In the barracks, mess and other quarters it was cold and damp because the boiler had long required a major overhaul. Due to the lack of coal and firewood, they often had to cut down trees which were growing on the territory of the facility. The personnel could wash irregularly, and they had to travel to the bathhouse on passing transport. These and other service irregularities were known to the commander and his deputy for political affairs, but the situation had not changed for the better.

I was on my way to the "point" with the secret hope that possibly, as they say, the author of the letter to the editor had overdone it. Certainly the aviators were serving just an hour's travel away from their unit where routine services for the men had been well organized. Did it take so much time or effort to do the same for a small military collective?

Along with the deputy subunit commander for political affairs, Officer G. Sokolov, I went into the soldiers' mess and barracks. And everywhere I had the most depressing impression. I must admit that it has been a long time since I have seen such things.

"Another subunit under the command of Officer Manuylov is responsible for the routine services of the 'point'," explained the deputy commander in justification.

But what did Comrade G. Manuylov have to say?

"Capt Volodin is in charge at the 'point.' He is the one to be concerned for the men. But I cannot demand this from him, as he is under the commander of a different unit...."

But Capt M. Volodin, as it turned out, is responsible only for the correct operation and maintenance of the communications equipment. In his words, the commander of the unit who assigns the men for duty is responsible for the domestic conditions of the signalmen.

And what happens? The buck is passed, but nothing happens.

POOR WEATHER FLIGHT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Col M. Zhuravlev from the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "The Masters Take Off First"]

[Text] At the take-off hut from a distance you could see a bright poster with the appeal: "An Outstanding Result for Each Precongress Day, A Grade of Excellent for Each Flight Shift!" These words have become a combat motto for the personnel of the fighter air regiment. And here, at the airfield, they acquire a concrete sense and are embodied in the results of carrying out the flight missions and in the assessment of the quality of work done by the aviators.

In one of the rooms of the take-off hut is a screen of the socialist competition. In the first half of each column showing a certain element of executing the flights, opposite the names of the aviators, are basically fives [the highest number of points]. These are the obligations assumed for the period of the next flight shift. To succeed in successfully carrying them out means that the overall result of the shift will be excellent.

Next to the screen of the competition they have hung up posters containing the conditions for carrying out the exercises planned for a routine flight day as well as leaflets devoted to the best aviators. One of them briefly describes the experience of the master of air combat, the communist Guards Maj V. Yashkin. The air flight under his command is not only an excellent one but has also been declared the best in the district aviation in terms of the results of the competition to properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress.

Another leaflet is devoted to the commander of the outstanding flight, Guards Capt G. Popok.

"We are proud of these pilots," says the political worker Guards Maj G. Vasil'yev. "Our youth is keeping up with them and is adopting the experience of the pacesetters."

The young flyers from the regiment show great interest in how the pacesetters of the competition have achieved high results in military improvement.

In speaking with the young officers prior to the flights, one is convinced that for them the experience of senior comrades is in no way an abstract concept. Each man earnestly adopts all the best in piloting and combat maneuvering and steadily reinforces his skills in working out the exercises in the air.

But would they be allowed to fly today, in such bad weather conditions? Clouds hung low over the airfield, and the horizon was lost in a dense haze. The young pilots looked impatiently at the deputy regimental commander, Guards Lt Col M. Balashov who had just made a flight for weather reconnaissance.

"We will fly," he said decisively. "I feel that each man is up to the mission...."

The airfield was drowned by the rising and falling roar of the jet engines. Three fighters were ready to take off. The flight controller gave the command over the radio, and the aircraft began their run, rapidly increasing their speed. The intervals between the aircraft were maintained flawlessly. What fine mastery of the equipment and what great teamwork there must be in order to fly with such great accuracy!

And the military pilots 1st class, Guards Lt Col M. Balashov, the commander of the outstanding squadron, Guards Maj V. Kuligovskiy and the flight leader, Guards Maj V. Stepanenkov, possess such mastery. They are all communists. They were the first to take off today, to reach the "enemy" and hit the targets on the first attack.

When Guards Maj Kuligovskiy glanced into the take-off hut after the flight, the agitator, Guards Sr Lt V. Bazhenov, had already put up a five in the "executed" column opposite his name on the competition screen. And the squadron commander was then approached by the pilots who congratulated him on his success. One of them glanced upwards questioningly as if to ask how were things beyond the clouds.

"Normal," replied Kuligovskiy. "It is merely a question of considering the particular features of the weather situation."

And he described how it was necessary to act under such conditions. Then he showed graphically how the "enemy" was intercepted and attacked. He gave a number of bits of advice on executing the maneuver for the landing approach with limited visibility.

During this time new grades appeared on the competition screen. Success had also come to Military Pilot 1st Class, Guards Capt G. Popok. He had excellently performed both interception flights planned for him. And now, Georgiy Yakovlevich [Popok], as the secretary of the squadron party organization, considered it his duty to talk with the party activists and see how things were going for the pilots, technicians and aviation specialists.

In the "executed" column there appeared more and more flight evaluations. And all of them were no lower than the assumed obligations. But it was still early to sum up the results of the flight day. The final result now depended on the young pilots. And how did they meet the set task?

The experienced aviators and party activists endeavor to help the young with both skilled advice and by personal example in preparing for the flights. Thus, Guards Maj Kuligovskiy worked with Guards Sr Lt S. Ganichev. By the "walking through the flight method," they jointly worked out each element of the forthcoming mission from take-off to landing and carefully thought through all the actions during the flight along the route. Then they took off together. The wingman, Guards Sr Lt Ganichev performed precisely and confidently in the flight. And following the example of his commander, he excellently executed the complex of exercises for combat employment.

The aviators of the subunit completed the flight shift with an excellent result. The mood of the pilot, Guards Sr Lt S. Ganichev, and the chief of the aviation equipment maintenance group Guards Sr Lt I. Chernetsov, was particularly good. On this day they had become the winners of the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

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AIR FORCES

FIGHTER COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Vetakh from the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District: "Missile Fights in the Skies"]

[Text] The weather that day was fine. But still before the start of the tactical flight exercise, the inner tension did not leave anyone. All the aviators from the interceptor squadron under the command of Military Pilot 1st Class, Maj O. Korovin, had resolved to consider the results of the exercise a combat report of the subunit to the 26th CPSU Congress. And although the air combat was called training and the person playing the part of the "enemy" was just your fellow serviceman, the pilots were confronted with a serious examination of combat maturity.

"Squadron to the air!" came the command over the airfield.

The fighter engines came to life. One after another the planes taxied to the runway and took off in close intervals.

In the cockpit of one of the missile-carrying aircraft was Sr Lt V. Chepurnoy. Comparatively little time had passed since he had finished aviation school, but even now this officer is a first-class military pilot. This is explained by the fact that the squadron has a considerate and attentive attitude toward the problems of the development of young pilots. The experienced instructors spare no effort so that the new men are shaped up in the shortest time. And this time the Military Sniper Pilot, Lt Col P. Chmykh, was flying in the two-plane element with Chepurnoy. He led his wingman to the attack against the target, and helped him make the attack stunning and rapid.

"Twenty-four, heading...altitude...," came the voice of the flight controller.

"Roger!"

And again silence on the airwaves.

"Target to the left of heading at a range of...," came the voice in the earphones.

Chepurnoy was all attention. The sight screen was still clear. But the enormous speed of the aircraft each second brought him closer to the target. And then its small blip appeared. "Target in sight!" reported the pilot and he prepared for the launch.

"Lock-on...launch!"

The pilot would receive his final grade on the ground when the data of the monitoring recorders would be known. But the preliminary result showed that the attack was effective. And here a portion of the accomplishment is due to the skill of the sniper strikes against ground targets by Officer P. Chmykh and the crew of the command post. The other pilots from the squadron also performed confidently in this exercise. The tactical and firing skills of the aviators were given a high grade.

The pilots demonstrated true combat maturity in the training missile engagement. This was the result of the unflagging attention shown by the squadron commander and party organization to improving the skills of the aviators and instilling in them truly fighter qualities. And here everything was mobilized for this. In the leading subunit ground training is carried out on a high level. Intense work is done for the effectiveness of each exercise and training session, and a situation of intolerance has been created for any sort of oversimplification and weaknesses.

And here there is a good tradition on which the communists of the squadron rely in indoctrinating the men. This subunit is part of a unit which has a glorious combat biography. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, many aviators under the colors of this unit won the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union. Their experience can be found in the present deeds of the younger generation of combat fighters. Here it has become a rule to visit the unit room of combat glory before responsible missions. The pilots, in preparing for training combat, recall the heroism of their fellow servicemen and carefully study and utilize the experience of the combat aces, certainly considering the fundamental qualitative changes in combat equipment.

The squadron also uses many forms of party political work which were carried out at the frontline airfields. This is convincingly seen from the plans of measures compiled for the period of the tactical flight exercise described here. A mobilizing role was also played by the party and Komsomol meetings held before the missile engagements and devoted to ensuring the example set by the communists and Komsomol members in carrying out the complex combat training missions. And here also is vividly designed visual agitation which urges that the party congress be celebrated with outstanding successes.

The results of the conducted exercise also show how effective this work is. Each squadron pilot, in flying out to the interception and in attacking the "enemy," endeavor to be loyal to the traditions born during the war years, that is, to hit the target on the first attack, and to skillfully and fully utilize the remarkable tactical flight qualities of the modern missile-carrying aircraft in the air engagement.

The squadron of interceptor fighters fully carried out the obligations assumed in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

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FIGHTER TACTICAL TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 81 p 1

[Article by Maj B. Makarevich from the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District: "A Sniper Pilot"]

[Text] A tactical flight exercise was underway. The "enemy" was breaking through toward an important objective from several directions, but, having encountered heavy air defense fire, with the coming of darkness reduced its activities. However, at the airfield the supersonic interceptors as before stood ready. Sensitive radars ceaselessly "swept" the celestial heavens. The alertness was justified as soon thereafter targets were detected at a maximum range. Upon the signal to take off, Lt Col Georgiy Titenko and Sr Lt Viktor Toropov hurried to their aircraft.

The bright cone of the afterburner flames cut through the nighttime darkness and rapidly disappeared among the stars. The aircraft controller gave the mission to intercept the air target, and Titenko already knew that he would be confronted with a duel against a high-speed, maneuvering "enemy" which employed jamming.

"Range...,azimuth...heading...afterburner mode," came the commands from the ground.

They were immediately embodied in the precise actions of the pilot. Sr Lt Toropov who took off a little later was guided to the target on a different channel. Under the cover of jamming and in skillfully using terrain features, another "enemy" aircraft was endeavoring to break through to the objective covered by the air defense weapons using a maximum low altitude. The situation was acute but in no way new.

Not long before this tactical flight exercise, the Military Sniper Pilot, Lt Col Georgiy Ivanovich Titenko, had conducted an exercise with the young aviators where among others they worked through a variation similar to the one now developing in the air. Thorough ground training and a creative approach to solving difficult tactical problems predetermined the success of both intercepts.

In the socialist competition which developed with renewed strength in this unit after the 26th CPSU Congress, the military aviators have endeavored to make maximum effective use of the combat equipment and work steadily for a high quality of training and a high level of personal training. The tone is set by the communists. Among them is Lt Col Titenko. He has mastered several types of aircraft and has

more than 2,500 hours of flying time and around 500 intercepts. Behind these externally dry figures is a high military skill which comes over the years. Once, in operations over a range, the situation developed in such a manner that he had to switch from radar search to visual. Titenko quickly spotted the target and hi it with the first missile.

And now, as soon as the missile-carrying aircraft was in the region of the target, the pilot promptly saw the blip on the screen of the radar sight and executed a turn. The "enemy" employed interference and used heading and altitude maneuvers. But the interceptor, having correctly guessed the plan, at supersonic speed confidently reached the best distance for the attack and made the launch.

Sr Lt Toropov, a young communist, who also had won good renown in the regiment as a right flanker in the competition, acted confidently and energetically in this engagement. He landed his missile-carrying aircraft several minutes after the landing of Lt Col Titenko and heard his leader's cheerful voice:

"How do you feel!"

"Excellent!" replied the senior lieutenant. "I saw the target at maximum range. The guidance was good...."

"Congratulations!" said Georgiy Ivanovich energetically shaking Toropov's hand.

Soon thereafter the data of the monitoring recorders and the command point confirmed that both intercepts had been successfully carried out.

It is said that teachers are happy when they repeat themselves in their students. Communist Titenko experienced true satisfaction as his subordinate skillfully carried out a mission of increased complexity. And on the same day, other students of Georgiy Ivanovich also took off with masters of combat employment to intercept air targets and won high grades. In the analysis of the exercise, the leader pointed out that the ground objectives had been dependably covered against "enemy" air strikes.

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AIR FORCES

TECHNICAL SERVICE TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Maj Tech Serv M. Borisenko, chief of the maintenance unit of the air regiment from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "With a Guarantee for Quality"]

[Text] For several years running the collective of our TECh [maintenance unit] has kept the title of outstanding. In recent months the average number of points given in the squadrons for the quality of aircraft repairs has reached 4.9. The time the aviation equipment remains at the work area has been reduced by 5 percent. These and other successes have caused in the men an understandable feeling of satisfaction with the results of their labor. At the same time they are aware that what has been achieved is not the limit. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the provisions and conclusions of the Accountability Report of the Party Central Committee point to reliable ways for a further improvement in all our work. One such way is seen by us in further activating the socialist competition.

Where do we see the reserves for increasing the efficiency and quality of labor? There are many of them. As is known, there is a direct dependence between the professional skill of a specialist and the quality with which the production operations are performed. For this reason, the struggle for a perfect knowledge of the aircraft equipment and the repair procedures and the acquiring of firm practical skills are one of the main areas of the competition in the TECh collective. The subunit is constantly receiving new specialists for whom our equipment is new. We endeavor to do everything so that the young soldiers quickly attain professional maturity. For this reason, in the training methods, along with the time-tested forms, there are also those which arose out of the precongress competition and the initiative of the leading officers.

Thus, Engr-Maj V. Klimchikov and Engr-Sr Lts Yu. Tarud'ko and S. Balandin have been the initiators of holding daily technical quizzes. The idea here is that at the beginning of the working day, the group chiefs hold with their subordinates unique colloquiums on the design and particular features of operating the mechanisms and on the procedures for carrying out repairs. When they just began to introduce these quizzes into practice, some felt that they would distract the aviators from their work and cause interruptions in the precise work rhythm. But this did not happen. On the contrary, such measures immediately focus the specialists on the struggle for the quality of repairs and on shortening the time for carrying them out.

Much that is new has been introduced also into the methods of teaching practical actions on the aviation equipment. Previously the young specialists gained the required skills in the process of making a rapair. Here, understandably, it was not always possible to repeat each operation in order to master it. Recently a trainer has been manufactured on which one can practice various actions which improve the professional skills of the specialists.

Or take this fact. Our collective is competing with the personnel of a TECh the deputy chief of which is Engr-Capt Ye. Kamar. Speaking frankly, elements of formalism could previously be observed in this rivalry. Only rarely did officers, in meeting in the corridors of service areas, exchange impressions on certain problems of training and indoctrination. Clearly such brief contacts were ineffective. But there was something to be learned from our colleagues. And then upon the initiative of the party organization, with the support of the commander, a decision was taken to thoroughly study the advanced experience of the adjacent unit.

The group chiefs, Capt Tech Serv A. Khlebanov and Sr Lt Tech Serv P. Tereshkov, together with the best experts of their job, Sr Lt Tech Serv L. Grishin, WO ["praporshchik"] V. Sergeyev and others, paid a visit to our rivals in order, as they say, to learn some sense. I should say straightaway that they succeeded in adopting many professional particular features in the work of the best men and to sense and adopt an atmosphere of intense struggle for quality. Upon returning to their own subunit, the officers and warrant officers endeavored to inform their comrades and introduce all the useful features which had been picked up from the others. As a result the exchanging of experience by such close contact helped disclose additional opportunities for improving the quality of the training and indoctrination process. Many soldiers improved their mastery and some also their skill rating. Now more than one-half of the personnel is masters and specialists first class.

The high professional level of the aviators in the TECh have made it possible to disclose reserves for improving the quality and shortening the time of repairs by improving repair procedures. For example, previously in making repairs, the radio technicians and mechanics were the first to set to work. The deputy chief of the TECh, Engr-Capt M. Martynyuk, having carefully studied the production schedule, proposed that the "floor" be given at the same time to specialists of the aircraft and engine group. This significantly broadened the work front and Martynyuk's proposal was supported. The change in the sequence of operations produced tangible results.

The broad range of a specialist's skills allows him to work quickly and productively and when necessary to take over for a comrade. For this reason the mastery of related professions by the aviators is an important component in the struggle of the collective for labor efficiency and quality. The party organization headed by Capt Tech Serv A. Kazak provides great help to the commander. Recently the party bureau heard a report by the CPSU member, Capt Tech Serv A. Khlebanov, on how the men of his group were improving their professional level. It was pointed out to the communist that not enough support was being given to the initative of

subordinates to master related specialties. Thus, the officer had not paid attention to the desire of the reenlisted Sgt V. Gayvoronskiy to master an additional range of jobs. After a principled and demanding discussion at the bureau, Khlebanov drew the correct conclusions from the critical comments. Now 80 percent of the aviators in the group successfully perform repairs on related procedures.

The high awareness and initiative of the men in the TECh, in producing an economic and qualitative effect, has been most apparent in rationalization work. Each new proposal to one degree or another helps to improve the accuracy of the checks, tunings and adjustments and to accelerate the operations. The benefit from the accessories which have been developed is obvious. For example, the magnetoscope made by WO V. Kozlov and which is used to establish the degree of oil purity, substantially eases the work of the specialists who have been entrusted with this crucial task and guarantees high quality work. Incidentally, this device was exhibited at the All-Union exhibit of national economic achievements. Under the leadership of Officer A. Khlebanov, the aviators have developed a device which makes it possible to collect the fuel residues from the fuel system in a tank. Previously in changing an engine, the fuel was allowed to flow out on the ground. In addition to the economic effect, the innovation also achieves indoctrinational aims and helps instill high work efficiency in the aviators.

The winter training period is nearly over. The flights are becoming evermore intensive and the work pace ever tauter in the TECh. At this time the personnel is working purposefully and fruitfully in carrying out the assigned jobs in a shortened time and with a guarantee of high quality.

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ROLE OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Sysoyenko: "At the Control Board"]

[Text] A missile-carrying aircraft was standing in front of the runway. You could taxi to the runway only under the condition that the aircraft coming in for a landing was a sufficient distance away. At present this was precisely the case, at a sufficient distance. But the traffic controller, Lt Col Viktor Kuz'mich Medvedev, radioed: "Forty-two, hold in formation."

"This pilot needs more time for preparing to take off," explained Viktor Kuz'mich. "He might not be able to do it in this time."

Lt Col Medvedev knows the character traits of each pilot. For this reason one can be confident that there will be no "unexpected events," and that he would not permit a dangerous approach of the aircraft in the air because of the delay of forty-two.

I remember hearing the conversation recently. Supposedly the work of the traffic controller was to know when to permit or prohibit the starting up of engines, take-offs and landings. I laughed to myself over this naivete as this showed a poor knowledge of the subject. Anyone who had ever acted as a traffic controller would never say this. Briefly this job can be described as follows: the solving of an infinite number of surprise inputs, often without sufficient time for reflecting. Certainly not every experienced pilot would be allowed to take over the flight controller's microphone.

The regimental commander had taken the decision to fly with the established weather minimum and Lt Col Medvedev was appointed the flight controller. Why precisely he? The conditions were maximally complicated. It was essential to have an experienced traffic controller who had spent not scores but hundreds of flight shifts behind the control board. It was also important that Viktor Kuz'mich is wise in the ways of life, he had seen many acute situations in the air and himself had repeatedly been involved in them. For a quarter of a century he had piloted an aircraft. He had more than a thousand hours flying time. Soon after Viktor Kuz'mich had become a squadron commander and completed the military academy, he was offered the job of traffic controller. Communist Medvedev without hesitating replied: "If it is necessary I am ready."

For each person the path to great mastery is not easy. And it was difficult for Viktor Kuz'mich. He started the mastery of his new duties by studying the flight regulations, although he had long been familiar with them. So he decided that a different approach was needed, hence he had to begin again in order to learn and understand all the fine points of his job, starting with its fundamentals. While previously, for example, it was enough to have a general understanding of the synoptic processes in the atmosphere, now he must understand them as well as a meteorologist. And Medvedev thoroughly mastered the synoptic method. Now he can predict the vicissitudes of variable weather as well as a specialist from this service.

Recently this ability of the traffic controller's was put to a serious test. The flights had started when the weatherman on duty gave him a storm warning as a thunderstorm was moving in from the west. Eight crews were still on the route. Viktor Kuz'mich ascertained their distance from the airfield, the speed and direction of the thunderclouds and issued the command to the senior crew of the command post to request the alternate airfield to prepare to receive our aircraft. He instructed the duty navigator to calculate the data for this.

Medvedev had considered such a circumstance. Darkness was approaching. The crews remaining in the air would have to land on an unfamiliar airfield in dusk, and the last three at night. All eight pilots had little experience in night flights.... And Viktor Kuz'mich from the returns from the thunderclouds, in looking at the radar screen, gave the order that the thunder would not hit the airfield before 30 minutes after the landing of the last crew if they used one particular method.

"There was a quartering headwind of 3-5 meters," reflected Viktor Kuz'mich aloud. "Our aircraft can land with a following wind of greater velocity. We must reverse the approach and bring them in not to the far beacon but rather immediately into a circle from the turn into the base leg. Then we will gain time."

And that was how it happened: when the thunder crashed they were already in the midst of the postflight analysis in the control tower....

Incidentally, a word about the ability of the controller to use the radar flight support equipment and his readiness to immediately aid crews which have gotten into a difficult situation. Here much training was required. And then work with an experienced controller. The distinguishing feature of communist Medvedev is his ability to critically assess his actions and analyze the actions of others. He noticed that the chief training him, as if in passing, along with his duties also did the work of the landing signal officer. He even handled his radio traffic. But the landing officer remained idle. Further observations of the conduct of the "fully covered" landing officer led one to conclude that in not much time the very essential specialist would be turned into a passive agent and his vigilance would be dulled. This was a dangerous thing! Certainly the traffic controller, in being distracted, could overlook something in the great flow of information on the rapidly changing air situation. And he would have no one to help him. "Great practical experience makes it possible for him to handle the job of two," reasoned Viktor Kuz'mich. "At first this would be beyond me. But without any extreme need what is the necessity of assuming the obligations which are specifically assigned to a concrete individual?..."

Thus he came to a conviction of the correctness of the rule: Each person should be responsible for the area of work assigned to him and do it conscientiously. Then the air traffic controller would have more time for monitoring the operations of all his assistants and would better "see" the air situation.

Once during night flights, the landing officer reported to Lt Col Medvedev that the landing radars were showing a blip from an aircraft which did not respond to the calls and was quickly closing in on our aircraft. What should be done?... There was no time to think as the aircraft could collide. Medvedev immediately commanded "his" pilot:

"Forty-five, hold at that level!" and briefly explained: "There is an aircraft behind you out of contact."

The distance between the blips on the glide indicator began to increase. Now they could begin to think about what to do with the "foreigner." The aircraft controller instructed that they seek information from a neighboring aircraft where flights were also underway. Perhaps the wanderer was from here?... From the course indicator one could see that the blip had turned sharply toward the neighboring "point." Hence the ill-starred crew had received a command from its own field....

Obviously in the life of every great expert there arrives a time when he experiences a need to share his knowledge and impart his experience to others. They say that in each of us lives at first a student and later a teacher. Viktor Kuz'mich has made several proposals to improve the training procedures for flight control and has shown their effectiveness. At present many are surprised that no one had ever thought of that simple thing before. But the author of this article could long describe what sort of teacher Viktor Kuz'mich is, as he has tasted the great effectiveness of Medvedev's pedagogical methods. No one obliged communist Medvedev to help in my growth. He showed this concern out of the commands of his heart and soul seeing that someone needed what he possessed in abundance and he hurried to share this. He spared no time. And he was already fully occupied. He gave lectures and talks on the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. In secondary school he conducted military patriotic work among the students. Nor did he forget to give a guiding hand to his son who was following in his father's footsteps. He was an officer candidate in a higher air force navigators school.

Viktor Kuz'mich has won merited respect among fellow servicemen for his profound political and military knowledge and his conscientious service. He is outstanding man, a leading specialist and a bulletin has been published on his experience. He is attentive in relations with comrades and when need be, principled. The communists have twice elected him the secretary of the subunit party bureau.

Man likes to dream. "My dream is a humble one," said Viktor Kuz'mich. "To train a worthy replacement. That is, a capable young man would take over the microphone and the flight control board."

It was early in the morning. The city had not yet awakened, but everything was in movement at the airfield. And with each passing minute, the pace of the flying day grew. And there was the first request to start engines. Lt Col Medvedev ordered:

"Raise the aviation flag!"

The green stars of the signal rockets hung in the sky. The flights had commenced.

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CSO: 1801/210

FIGHTER PILOT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Lt Col G. Ivanov from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "As Combat Demands"]

[Text] A dense fog prevented the flights from beginning on time, but the regiment commander, Lt Col A. Kornev, was in no hurry to move the flying to another day. He kept in touch with the weatherman to see if visibility would improve. Soon thereafter a report to this effect came in. Kornev immediately gave the command over the loudspeaker system:

"Belyakov and Roslyakov ready for take-off."

Immediately the roar of jet engines was heard over the airfield. The flight leader, Capt V. Roslyakov, was preparing to take his exam for first class. Initially Lt Col A. Belyakov would check his piloting techniques, and then he would carry out a flight along a route. If the flight came off successfully, the socialist obligations assumed for the winter period to train the combat pilots for first-class skills would be carried out.

On the stand showing the course of the competition in the air regiment, I had already seen an "express leaflet" which stated that the pilots, Sr Lts Ye. Dronov, N. Maksimov, R. Amerkhanov and V. Kireyev had successfully passed the examination for first class. Now just in the squadron headed by Lt Col V. Vinogradov 75 percent of the pilots were first class. The regiment commander had set the example for the flyers in steadily improving his skills. Lt Col A. Kornev had the qualification of "Military Sniper Pilot."

What had helped the aviators of the unit in so successfully carrying out the training plans and the socialist obligations. Some feel that the regiment was helped this year by the weather as virtually all the planned flight shifts were held. Undoubtedly this was an important contributing factor. But we feel that the question was not merely in the favorableness of the weather conditions. At adjacent airfields one repeatedly saw that the planning table was not completely carried out with excellent weather. But here there were no such instances. The "secret" is simple. The regiment endeavored to intensify the training process as much as possible and to achieve the greatest effectiveness and quality of each flight mission with minimum expenditures. This profoundly party, efficient approach to

carrying out the important tasks of ensuring a further rise in the combat readiness conforms fully to the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Just take the following example. The officer leaders considered that during the winter months in these areas, as a rule, the difficult weather conditions would help to improve the class rating of the pilots. What other "hitches" could there be here? First of all flight intensity could be reduced due to the lack of instructors with the corresponding skill level. This was considered and by the time of the onset of bad weather, the instructors were in excellent professional form. All the flight leaders by the beginning of the year could train their subordinates in the clouds. For example, Capts V. Klimov and D.Dayev did not need to ask for aid from superior chiefs to give introductory flights to their subordinates.

By their mistakes in piloting techniques the young pilots could cause delays or interruptions in flight operations. And this was also taken into account. The unit's pedagogical council headed by Lt Col A. Belyakov played a major role in working with the insufficiently experienced pilots. Specific recommendations were worked out ahead of time to train the pilots considering individual traits. For example, Sr Lt I. Borvkin had just begun to check out on a new aircraft. In Sr Lts Ye. Litvinov and B. Kozlov, the instructors noticed certain unsure actions in controlling the aircraft. These three officers were given dates for making repeat flights with instructors.

The flights during the winter months in the regiment were carried out evenly with a gradual increase in intensity. The crews worked steadily on the methods for crossing "enemy" air defenses. In a tactical flight exercise on the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress, Majs V. Vutyanov and Yu. Koval'chuk, Capts V. Levochkin and D. Gladkov, Sr Lt O. Erzin and others convincingly showed that their air skills had improved significantly. But this was also the result of creative search, the steady work of the organizers of the training process and the competition and their planned efforts.

It is usually felt that the intensity of flights involving combat employment increases sharply only in the summertime. But the regiment decided that in no instance should there be a decline in the pace set last summer for this type of training. How was this task carried out? With the aid of a tactical range. This also solved another problem, that is, how to bring the training flights as close as possible to real combat conditions. They trained at full force. It was particularly difficult for the crews when the flights at the range were under the control of the Military Sniper Navigator, Lt Col V. Kirilenko, who in an able and inventive way camouflaged the targets and often changed their position. The pilot would be looking for a missile unit along the edge of a forest, but there it would be among abandoned structures. Another time officer Kirilenko set out the dummies in such a manner that it was comparatively easy to detect them but there was nothing to "tie them down," as nearby there were no characteristic markers needed for accurately determining the target coordinates.

Officer Kirilenko created such complications rather often and this put even certain experienced pilots in a difficult situation. But no one complained. On the contrary, this increased combat activeness. Lt Col Kirilenko ordinarily entered his comments on the actions of a crew over the tactical range in a log and later analyzed them in the flight analysis. He often mentioned as an example such combat pilots as Military Sniper Pilot Lt Col N. Onatskiy and the first-class pilot Maj V. Vutyanov. And here often there was an exchange of experience.

All of this helped to achieve high effectiveness and quality in the flights, to develop the tactical thinking of the aviators and the ability to quickly and correctly orient oneself in a difficult situation. Thus, while at the start of the year Sr Lt P. Petlevannyy took repeated runs to determine the target coordinates, recently he has done this on the first run.

The rhythmical operations of the pilots have been largely aided by the close and effective work of the engineers, technicians and mechanics, by the exemplary maintenance and by the prompt and high-quality preparation of the aircraft for the flights. All the aircraft are excellent in the flights where Officers N. Snisar', V. Bobyr' and G. Dzhurayev, all highly skilled masters, are the chiefs of the maintenance units.

Incidentally, it cannot be said that everything in the regiment goes as scheduled. It does happen that at times certain hitches are discovered. It is a different matter of how they react to these. They react sharply. Particularly the party organization. Once the aircraft monitoring equipment was poorly prepared for a flight. This impeded an assessment of how the crew carried out the flight mission. The work on this equipment had been under the supervision of Engr-Sr Lt A. Khozhainov and Sr Lt Tech Serv N. Akulenko. Immediately, as they say, hot on the trail, a report was given by communists Khozhainov and Akulenko at a party bureau session on how they had instilled a feeling of responsibility in their subordinates for ensuring flight safety, how they inculcated in them the skills of high technical efficiency and how they organized the competition for achieving outstanding quality in maintenance on modern aircraft.

The party organization actively and promptly endeavors to support all the best but helps to achieve high efficiency in military service. For example, the communists noticed that the keeping of a competition diary by the flight leaders helped to increase the atmosphere of competitiveness, and immediately they were concerned with introducing this in the work practices of all the commanders. This is time consuming work but it is beneficial. Evaluations for the elements of the competition and the successes and mistakes of the aviators are entered in the diary, the places held by each officer are noted and the results for the week or month are summed up. In being accumulated over time, these data help the commander to spot trends in the attitude of one or another subordinate to his job or service, to objectively and concretely determine the winner and the laggard and to analyze the level of professional training of each man.

A greater intensity in the training process and higher efficiency and quality in the exercises carried out are a complicated and diverse task which requires initiative and a creative search on the part of each person. The communist leaders and all the aviators of the regiment, inspired by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, in a tenacious and purposeful manner are carrying out these tasks and achieving successes.

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CSO: 1801/210

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. ACTIVITIES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by L. Zagorskiy: "The Virus in Military Uniform. The Monstrous Experiments of the Pentagon and CIA to Influence the Human Mind"]

[Text] The Pentagon and the CIA are collaborating in the field of developing agents to influence the human brain and mind. The final goal of this joint "research" is to find ways of turning people into robots. However, whereas the CIA, which engages in spying, sabotage, terror and political assassinations, emphasizes the use of such agents against individuals, they interest the Pentagon primarily as a combat weapon of mass destruction.

Poison gases, preparations that cause diseases such as smallpox, poliomyelitis, fever, tuberculosis, typhus and cholera, and microorganisms capable of destroying plants and food stocks have been concentrated in the warehouses of the U.S. Army and on the territory of their allies' countries. In various parts of the world microbiologists wearing military uniforms are tirelessly seeking the kinds of species of bacteria and viruses that can cause very dangerous and mass epidemics. In particular, the U.S. Navy research center in Taipei and a similar center in Cairo are engaged in this activity.

The United States has repeatedly employed chemical weapons, including during the aggression in Korea and against Vietnam. Saboteurs captured in Afghanistan have been equipped with American grenades filled with "C.S." poisonous gas.

The Pentagon is now giving its primary attention to substances capable of paralyzing the human consciousness. Many agents that exert a psychochemical effect have been developed by the U.S. Army on the basis of the hallucinogen LSD. [S. Cogan] tells about their effect in the book "Drugs of Hallucination." He writes: "Soldiers whose coffee was laced with a small amount of the potion were unable to obey simple commands and individual tasks with an acceptable degree of accuracy.... When the effect of the coffee wore off two soldiers were unable to stop laughing and then had irrepressible attacks of giggling throughout the afternoon. Other soldiers were unfit for combat." One of the U.S. Army's most powerful psychochemical agents is the narcotic preparation "BZ." The eminent American scientist D. [Shneyer] points out that its effect is ten times greater than the "effectivness" of LSD. About 50 tons of this drug have been stored at U.S. Army bases in the states of Arkansas, Maryland and Utah.

The Pentagon strives continuously to add to its arsenal even more refined kinds of weapons developed on a fundamentally new scientific and technical basis. The method of subjecting the human brain by means of computers is considered extremely promising. Research on the "Computer--human brain" problem for military ends is financed by the U.S. Defense Department Administration for Advanced Projects [sic]. One million dollars are allocated each year for this project. Several American universities including the universities of Illinois, Stanford and Rochester Universities and also the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are participating in this work.

In the words of specialists engaged on this project, even in 1976 it had "passed beyond the stage of laboratory development and was ready for testing." The U.S. NASA has developed corresponding technology and equipment designed for practical application of the results that have been obtained.

The Pentagon tries in every possible way to "substantiate" its monstrous preparations and to justify them to the public. In a propaganda campaign that has been noticeably stepped up recently the standard bearers of the assault on the human brain are using arguments that were formulated two decades ago. At the end of the fifties the Pentagon carried out operation "Blue Sky." Its aim was to prove that chemical agents will make any future war more humane, "without death, mutilation or the destruction of property." Utter hypocrisy is heard in the expatiation of the priests of Mars. Discussing the "absolute safety" of psychochemical weapons, one highly placed U.S. government official stated: "Ideally we would like to achieve a situation in which a small amount of an atomized agent could be squirted at someone and the enemy forced to come out of his position with his hands behind his back and whistling the American national anthem."

In actuality, however, the use of psychochemical agents even in concentrations that do not cause death, lead to tragic consequences. Sevicemen subjected to these agents at Fort Benning, Georgia, become epileptics. Even a single touch of preparation "BZ" is dangerous. Thus, a soldier who worked with this agent while wearing protective clothing rapidly became a schizophrenic.

It is evident that the various psychiatric disorders from which many U.S. soldiers who fought in Vietnam now suffer is the result of the effect of these kinds of agents.

Now, in the United States, they are trying to review the strategic concepts for waging war, taking into account the use of psychochemical agents. The general contours of such a doctrine have been worked out by one of the leaders of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Wilson Green, in his report entitled "Psychochemical warfare: a New Concept of War." In it he shows that the use of agents that affect the human brain is creating quite new conditions for conducting military operations. In their book "Manipulators of the Mind," [V. Sheflin] and [E. Opton] write: From the viewpoint of the U.S. military strategists, nuclear weapons have made the idea of victory null and void." Accordingly, they continue, the only correct decision from the viewpoint of the United States is to activate the doctrine of chemical and biological warfare, not in its old meaning, but by taking into account agents that affect the human psychic system.

The "brass hats" (as they call the Pentagon people) that are possessed with a mania for military superiority are calling for the expansion of production of chemical and psychochemical weapons and trying to achieve legalization of their use. The West German magazine DER SPIEGEL notes that U.S. military specialists are demanding an end to the moratorium on the use of poisonous gases, and the U.S. Congress allocates large sums for the development of a new generation of chemical weapons.

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